Science Is Profoundly Changing the Dynamics of Bioterrorism

åǥÁö

Since 1945, mankind¡¯s worst nightmare has been nuclear weapons. But, for the next generation, the worst nightmare is likely to be biological weapons.






Science Is Profoundly Changing the Dynamics of Bioterrorism


Since 1945, mankind¡¯s worst nightmare has been nuclear weapons. But, for the next generation, the worst nightmare is likely to be biological weapons. The threat related to an unstoppable and rapidly spreading man-made plague has made books like The Hot Zone1 best-sellers.

But how real is this scenario? And in a world beset by terrorist threats, how much do we need to worry that the means to create biological weapons of mass destruction will get into their hands? Is America¡¯s $5.6 billion Project BioShield plan enough to protect U.S. citizens from biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear attack ? or do we need more?

The reality of today¡¯s rapidly advancing biological and genetic sciences is that DNA bases and other biological components are readily available from various jobbingcompanies for a few hundred dollars. And, anyone can go to a Web site like eBay or LabX and purchase a DNA synthesizer for as little as $500.

A centrifuge, necessary for refining biological weapons, can be purchased on the Internet for about $5,000. Chemical reagents for completing the job would cost another $200 or so ? also available on the Web. And an incubator for growing the culture of cells would cost anywhere from a few hundred to a few thousand dollars ? again, delivered from Internet sources. Depending on how sophisticated the equipment is, the total cost of a lab capable of synthesizing pathogens could cost as little as $10,000.

As we all know, the ¡°genie of technology¡± can¡¯t be put back in the bottle. Once something is invented, it can¡¯t be made to disappear and will only grow more sophisticated with time. Therefore, we must adjust to living in a world in which biological systems will eventually become manipulated as easily as electronic ones are now.

Last February, the National Research Council,a part of theNational Academy of Sciencesreleased a report that predicted the appearance of biohackers ? homegrown biotechnologists, capable of making new pathogenic organisms with unique and unpredictable characteristics. Assuming this is true, what could they realistically produce?

The focus since September 11, 2001, has been on anthrax, smallpox, and other common disease-causing agents that were investigated by national laboratories during the Cold War. Fortunately, those microorganisms are very difficult to come by. In some sense, they are like the enriched uranium or plutonium needed to make nuclear weapons: Getting the ingredients is the hard part.

But, with today¡¯s technology, you don¡¯t have to get the genuine organisms in order to create bio-weapons with enormous killing potential. Consider the fact that in 2002, researchers built a functioning poliovirus from scratch, using off-the-shelf genetic material purchased from a mail-order house.

Two years later, another group made the much more complex smallpox virus using such readily available materials. Yet even more worrisome are the completely new viruses that could be invented by hackers manipulating the genetic code.

According to a recent report in MIT Technology Review,2 this sort of biohacking has already been extensively investigated and carried out in the former Soviet Union. It resulted in whole new classes of biological weapons ? ones that could damage the nervous system, alter moods, trigger psychological changes, and of course, kill.

In one program, the researchers inserted DNA into a pneumonia-causing bacterium that normally produced only mild illness. The DNA was of a type that made fragments of myelin protein from animals. Myelin is the sheath around neurons that is essential to their functioning, like the insulation on the wiring of your house.

When the Russian scientists infected mice with the pneumonia, that illness came and went quickly, as it usually does. But then the concealed mammalian myelin fragments were detected by the immune system, which recognized it as foreign and mounted a full-blown attack against not only the animal myelin, but that belonging to the host as well. When your immune system attacks your own myelin, it¡¯s known as multiple sclerosis, and there¡¯s no cure. All the mice died.

The prospect of doing the same with a pneumonia bacterium that could infect humans has some experts terrified. The fact that a large-scale Russian weapons lab could do this by hand as early as the 1980s reveals what¡¯s possible today even for a few technicians with modern equipment.

The synthesis of such organisms reportedly took the Russians months, or even years, of manual work in sophisticated labs. But, it can now be carried out automatically in days, or even hours, with equipment that could be set up in a garage.

MIT Technology Review3 describes even more frightening Russian research involving what are known as chimeras, which are combinations of multiple organisms. One particularly diabolical example is the combination of the Ebola virus with the black plague bacterium. Contrary to popular conception, black plague is not a serious biothreat in the modern world. It¡¯s a bacterium, not a virus; in fact, a quick course of the common antibiotic tetracycline cures it completely.

The Soviet scientists designed ? and perhaps actually synthesized ? a kind of ¡°biological time bomb¡± in which the Ebola virus, for which there is no cure, was hidden inside the black plague bacterium. When the victim was treated for the initial symptoms, the tetracycline killed the plague bacteria, releasing the much more potent and deadly Ebola. The victim would then go on to infect numerous others, even as his diagnosis was confused by the previous presence of the plague.

Combine this scenario with terrorists willing to go on suicide missions to infect others, and you have the stuff of nightmares: All you¡¯d need would be a dozen or so willing volunteers to travel to major cities after allowing themselves to be injected with this time-bomb pathogen.

Killing people, though, represents just one type of weapon in an arsenal that promises far more variety than anything in military history. A whole new range of bioweapons was investigated by the Russians that could modify behavior by targeting the nervous system, inducing anything from schizophrenia to immobilizing depression or fear. They were also able to use recombinant DNA to increase pain thresholds in lab animals.

Meanwhile, Western scientists have augmented the memory function in rats and have also been able to completely wipe out memory as well with targeted pathogens. The National Academy of Sciences report even describes the possibility of pathogens that will target specific ethnic groups.

On the other hand, there are numerous experts in the field who believe that terrorists are not the most likely developers or users of biological weapons. In fact, many believethat if terrorists had any biological weapons, they would have used them already. Those same experts are much more concerned that a nation state, such as North Korea, will start a new program to develop biological weapons.

And as reported in New Scientist,4 when that happens, programs like BioShield, which concentrate on smallpox and anthrax, will not be helpful, because the new pathogens are likely to be ones never seen before, with effects that cannot be predicted.

Given this compelling trend, we offer the following six forecasts for your consideration:

First, rather than restricting research in this area, it is in the nation¡¯s interest to promote it. It is already happening in other countries, and we need to be on the cutting edge to understand the technology and recognize the threats. Open discussion, such as we see in the National Academies of Sciences report, is essential to progress.

Second, in the 10-year time line, it¡¯s possible that we will see attempts made by terrorists to use biological weapons. Something similar was already carried out when a fringe group attacked the Japanese subway system with a nerve agent. But early attempts are likely to be limited or ineffective. Making a pathogen is one thing. Finding a way to weaponize and distribute it is another.

Third, most technologically advanced nations will sign treaties to restrict the development and use of biological weapons. In a world where people can travel across continents in a few hours, truly infectious diseases would spread around the globe, and any attack would be suicidal. There will be a powerful incentive not to act.

Fourth, we can expect to see scenarios like the one we¡¯re seeing today with Iran, in which a nation is poised to develop a threat, and the world community rises up to stop it. Most of these cases will result in more saber-rattling than action. In a globalized world, no nation can afford to be a rogue anymore.

Fifth, when a real threat does materialize, it will be disruptive more as a result of fear or panic than as a result of a genuine biological attack. If people believe they might be attacked, they can disrupt their own society and economy. Education will help allay these fears and keep people from overreacting. But in addition, we are about to see the marriage of biotechnology and nanotechnology. With that development will come the ability to detect and destroy any pathogen, even ones we have never seen before. Those nations with the best defense will effectively ¡°vaccinate¡± themselves against bioterror.

Sixth, we are at the beginning of a biological and medical revolution more profound than anything ever seen in history. The very tools that cause us to worry about terrorist threats from biological agents hold the promise for curing virtually every disease now known. How we choose to use those tools will determine our future. References List :

1. The Hot Zone: A Terrifying True Story by Richard Preston is published by Random House. ¨Ï Copyright 1994 by Richard Preston. All rights reserved. 2. MIT Technology Review, March/April 2006, ¡°The Knowledge,¡± by Mark Williams. ¨Ï Copyright 2006 by Technology Review. All rights reserved. 3. ibid. 4. New Scientist, June 10, 2006, ¡°Biologists Risk Becoming Accidental Terrorists,¡± by Peter Aldhous. ¨Ï Copyright 2006 by Reed Business Information, Ltd. All rights reserved.

ÀÌÀü

¸ñ·Ï